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Prior to having its authenticity and transparency examined, the openness of human existence may 
be said to need preservation as is, regardless of its receptivity and responsiveness to the truth of 
Being. Paradoxically, in self-sacrifice the fulfilment of Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-being is 
dependent upon a most radical disowning of itself. This investigation approaches self-sacrifice on 
the basis of its analogy with the creation of the work of art – as the peculiar fixation of the existing, 
already disclosed world of everydayness within Dasein’s final absence. Finally, the suggestion is 
made that the incommensurable greatness of the heroic self-sacrifice needs to be itself preserved 




The Obstructing Openness of Dasein 
 
Heidegger’s emphasis on the necessity of extricating 
ourselves from the world of everydayness for the sake 
of a more authentic one has by now become a 
philosophical commonplace. Especially nowadays, a 
question deserving renewed attention is whether one 
can take for granted this disparaged world of 
everydayness as much as Heidegger does. He dwells 
at length on the issue of preserving the truth of Being 
from being obscured, although this may not always be 
the most immediate danger. Somewhat along 
Levinasian lines, it can be argued that, prior to having 
its authenticity and transparency examined, the 
openness of human existence needs preservation as 
is – that is, regardless of its receptivity and 
responsiveness to the truth of Being. In this sense, it 
emerges as most worthy of thinking that, in the midst 
of an obstinate silence of Being, Dasein sometimes 
chooses to step in, assume the latter’s role and 
generously offer its very there to others. How does 
Heidegger’s philosophy accommodate the disturbing 
fact that, even neglectful of Being, at times Dasein 
rushes to preserve the openness of just another entity 
like itself at the cost of having to close its own? 
 
Referring to the act of artistic creation, Heidegger 
points out that “the artist remains somewhat 
inconsequential as compared with the work, almost 
like a passageway that destroys itself in the creative 
process for the work to emerge” (1934-35/1994, p. 
29). Self-sacrifice is precisely the case in which the 
destruction mentioned most literally takes place. This 
paper approaches it on the basis of its analogy with 
the creation of an artwork – or, more precisely, as the 
peculiar fixation [Feststellung] of the existing, 
already disclosed world of everydayness within 
Dasein’s final absence. The peculiarity mentioned has 
to do with the discomforting idea of making one’s 
own death serviceable, of using it as a medium for the 
inscription of meaning – a phenomenon on the verge 
of trivialization in today’s world. Self-sacrifice 
discloses a horizon of possibilities that, just like 
artistic creation, eventually acquires independence in 
relation to the agent’s existence; for this reason, while 
distancing itself from the prudent action (which has 
the same mode of Being as its end) it remains caught 
up in an irreducible kinship with the production of 
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tools and artworks.  
 
And yet, the acme of prudence is not intrinsically 
incompatible with the view that, in special 
circumstances, Dasein merely stands in the others’ 
way toward the common good, not unlike a 
craftsman’s experiment that, upon failing, starts to 
obstruct his techne. The act through which Dasein 
withdraws its ontic opaqueness into the ultimate 
background can, at the same time, be regarded as a 
donation to others of a more transparent version of the 
world. The latter can no longer be called Dasein’s 
own in a strong sense, but turns out to have been co-
owned all along. Dasein’s very Being-in-the-world 
can be donated thanks to its essential transmissibility:  
it is only something most originally owned in 
common by its giver and receiver that can be 
transmitted, not something totally alien to the receiver; 
in the case of the contrary, the radical alterity of what 
is to be transmitted can never be reduced simply 
through reception.1 
 
Most importantly, on the point of abandoning its own 
capacity to act, Dasein “flirts” with infinitude: in a 
mimetic emulation of Being, it gives its Being-with 
[Mitsein] a basis, it literally gives way by offering its 
there to the relevant others as access to a good 
beyond its own reach, but possibly within theirs. The 
grammatical dative is misleading here: if Being-with 
constitutes Dasein’s essential structure, it makes no 
sense to ask if this donation is addressed to itself or to 
others and as such to stress that in self-sacrifice 
Dasein does not, after all, give itself a foundation. 
One remembers that this tendency to impose a strong 
dichotomy upon the phenomenon has already been 
overcome through Heidegger’s introduction of the 
concept of Being-with. 
 
In order to understand the problems that self-sacrifice 
poses to Heidegger’s ontology of finitude, one needs 
to begin by correctly situating this act within the 
heterogeneous field of human praxis as a whole. In 
this sense, it is useful to remember that the most 
consequential step of Heidegger’s ontologizing 
reading of Aristotle consists in moving phronesis to 
the highest position in the place of sophia upon an 
analysis of the extent to which each of these practices 
 
                                                
1 It is according to this logic that one cannot regard one’s 
own death as something givable or receivable: “Even if one 
gives me death to the extent that it means killing me, that 
death will still have been mine and as long as it is 
irreducibly mine I will not have received it from anyone 
else. Thus dying can never be taken, borrowed, transferred, 
delivered, promised, or transmitted” (Derrida, 1992/1995, p. 
44). 
discloses its end. 2  For both thinkers, the highest 
ontological excellence is ascribable to that 
comportment which makes its own end most 
transparent. 
 
My contention is that this ontologization of praxis 
reaches an inner limit when trying to grasp the 
essence of self-sacrifice, which in what follows stands 
for the deliberate actualization of Dasein’s possibility 
of its impossibility. If, as Heidegger claims, Dasein is 
essentially a solicitous Being-towards-death, the act 
of dying for its meaningful others calls the primacy of 
phronesis into question. The challenger turns out to 
be techne, a type of comportment with which, as it 
will be argued here, the supreme sacrifice has a 
problematic connivance. When the community’s only 
possibility of Being stands and falls with Dasein’s 
demise, the latter may have to be understood by 
proceeding from the paradigm of techne – that is, as a 
failed experiment that, unless abandoned in due 
course, would threaten to lead the meaningful others 
into an existential dead-end. 
 
The Ontologization of Aristotle’s Theory of Praxis 
 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the Nicomachean Ethics 
is based upon the thesis that, in the ancient Greeks’ 
approach to human comportment, the primary issue 
was neither the basic convictions behind their actions, 
nor the practical success thereof, but rather the 
meaning of the human mode of Being (1924-
25/1992a, p. 178). Starting already at the level of 
translation, this ontologization of Aristotle’s practical 
philosophy purports to thematize for any given 
comportment the implicit situation that determines its 
end. 
 
Regarding the capacity to make their own essence 
transparent, human comportments differ significantly 
from one another. Aristotle ranked them according to 
the excellence of the object they deal with, since, 
according to him, it is the object that each time elicits 
the specific type of behavioural disclosure wherein its 
essence emerges. Overall, Book VI(7) of the 
Nicomachean Ethics placed sophia highest because 
the unchanging was, in general, privileged by the 
Greek mind in its longing to share in the perfect 
Being of the contemplated first principles. 
 
In Heidegger’s ontologizing reading, techne stands 
for a mode of knowledge governing the possible 
becoming of man-made things. While the first 
 
2 The term ontologization has long won acceptance among 
some Heidegger scholars (Kisiel, 1993, p. 146; Volpi, 1992, 
p. 106) though others prefer essentialization (Caputo, 1991, 
p. 32). 
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principles of natural entities lie within themselves, 
those of artifacts are situated somehow “next to” them 
[para] where this proximity is not to be taken 
spatially but ontologically, that is, as referring to the 
non-coincidence of two modes of Being. The final 
product of techne gets released into its autonomous 
mode of Being – “parallel to” that of its producer – 
only upon being completed, when it first really 
becomes what it is. In this sense, tools and artworks 
have in common their being independent of and 
situated “next to” the act of their production. 
 
Unlike techne, phronesis always discloses its object 
in relation to the thinker’s mode of Being, which for 
Heidegger coincides with her very possibilities (1924-
25/1992a, p. 58). Moreover, it does not flee the 
essential contingency in which the human mode of 
Being is caught, as episteme and sophia are said to do. 
As thoughtful openness toward the situation, it is 
deemed to reach deeper than both episteme focused 
on the unchanging and techne with its limited, 
somewhat accidental relation to its own end. The 
entity disclosed in it – the good end to pursue – has 
the same mode of Being as the disclosing act, as 
phronesis itself, since, in Aristotle’s view, “good 
action itself is its end” (1140, b7). This is to say that 
the good action does not stand “next to” the 
consideration of the good but, as the very end toward 
which this act of considering is directed, it represents 
the consummation of the prudent thinker’s effort to 
understand her acts, and thus herself. Such an 
understanding is a discursive disclosure of effective 
possibilities that first allows them to get underway 
toward actualization. 
 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the term logos as 
Dasein’s available possibilities to make itself 
transparent departs from the traditional rendition of 
the concept as lawful disposition, or specifically 
human capacity of an animal, toward the idea of quest 
for access to Being. In this ontological sense, 
transparency is neither a quality attached to the act of 
seeing through, nor a matter seen, but rather the 
condition of possibility of access understood as 
available familiarity with what is thus accessed. This 
idea of possibility finds its limits in the specific 
experiences of the aporia, of the uncanny, of the alien 
and of the amazing, all of which manifest in various 
ways the end of Dasein’s familiarity with its world. 
Authentic appropriation of what initially resists all 
attempts to come to terms with it occurs when a new 
world is given to Dasein – a moment coinciding with 
a re-appropriation of the latter’s existence as a whole. 
According to Heidegger, the transparency belonging 
to this new world – that is, its practical intelligibility – 
is brought about by the moment of vision [Augenblick] 
that may accompany Dasein’s resolve to face the 
anxiety-generating opaqueness of the limit. 
 
From the authentic confrontation with what allows of 
no passage on familiar terms, Dasein may get the 
vision of a new world opening up to it; it may catch 
sight of an uncharted realm, the essential paths of 
which are supposed to become accessible to it in the 
vision itself. What interests us here in the first place is 
that, for Dasein, the reaching of its limits – 
experienced as cataclysm of its familiar world – 
although shattering its understanding, is said not to 
affect the mineness [Jemeinigkeit] of the new 
possibilities disclosed. However, it could be that, 
upon its anxiety-generating clash with the limit, not 
only Dasein’s understanding of the world expands 
beyond its previous limits, but also its understanding 
of ownership. In adopting a course of action that 
requires the agent to yield its very there to others, 
Dasein seems to bring to fulfilment its ownmost – that 
is, its solicitude [Fürsorge] for others – by 
paradoxically disowning itself in a most radical way.3 
 
Through ontologization, praxis is entrusted to logos 
as the dimension in which the specifically human 
possibilities first come to be what they are upon 
prudent deliberation. For Heidegger, the superlative 
of being human can be reached only by questioning 
the ontological situation of one’s act with a view to 
rendering transparent its essential determinations. All 
the other kinds of praxis are seen as based upon an 
appropriation of specific possibilities always more 
originally disclosed by phronesis. An appropriation 
that does not essentially purport to call into question 
its ultimate grounds is ipso facto merely a form of 
actualization and hence, for humans, a lesser mode of 
Being. And yet, Heidegger designates self-sacrifice as 
the highest human act, despite the prudent 
deliberation that it does not so much silence as bring 
into focus the agent’s own freedom (in the sense of 
Emmanuel Levinas’s claim that “to receive the Other 
is to bring my own freedom into question” [1971, p. 
84]). 
  
Notwithstanding this, one should not too hastily rush 
to dissolve praxis into logos, for Heidegger stresses 
that “the phronesis is in the praxis even more than in 
logos” (1924-25/1992a, p. 138). Although somehow 
already accomplished in the preview [Vorblick] of the 
 
3  Commenting on the same aspect of Heidegger’s 
philosophy, Derrida writes: “My own death becomes this 
irreplaceability that I must assume if I wish to have access 
to what is absolutely mine. My first and last responsibility, 
my first and last desire, is that responsibility of 
responsibility that relates me to what no one else can do in 
my place” (1992/1995, pp. 43-44). 
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action, the prudent act is, after all, said to come to its 
fulfilment in the actual performance. What exactly is 
then the relationship between an act’s putative 
accomplishment in a preview and its full actualization? 
 
Sheltering the World of Everydayness 
 
Let us consider for a moment the unrelated 
[unbezüglich] character that the possibility of death is 
ascribed in Being and Time, since it appears to play 
an important yet ambiguous role in the 
individualization of Dasein. It is this possibility of 
death that, through its severing character, is credited 
with both extracting Dasein from its inauthentic 
relations to others and triggering the very opposite, 
that is, Dasein’s solicitous turning toward others. On 
the one hand, the possibility of death “makes manifest 
that all Being-alongside the things with which we 
concern ourselves, and all Being-with Others, will fail 
us when our ownmost potentiality-for-Being is the 
issue” (1927/1962, p. 308, emphasis added). But, on 
the other hand, via Dasein’s resolve the same 
possibility of death “pushes it [the Self] into 
solicitous Being with Others” (1927/1962, p. 344). In 
other words, a resolute facing of the possibility of 
death breaks and mends with the same stroke one of 
Dasein’s existentials – its  Being-with. 
 
One cannot say that in anxiety Dasein simply 
continues to be its existentials while only the 
existentiell changes, for the proximity of death calls 
into question this very continuity. Too strong a 
distinction between a would-be intact continuity of 
the existentials and the changing existentiell would 
render death somewhat superfluous in contrast with a 
mode of Being credited with enduring unaffected in 
the proximity of the ultimate limit. Death threatens to 
become a mere accident for existence unless the very 
structure of the latter changes under that peculiar 
pressure exerted upon it by death in the form of 
anxiety. If, in the immediate proximity of its end, 
human existence already gets contaminated with the 
categorial and thus ceases to be just its possibilities, 
then resolve can be said to perform a de-structuring 
and re-structuring of Dasein’s mode of Being. 
 
Seven years after Being and Time, Heidegger started 
conceptualizing a rift [Riß] that not only sets itself 
forth into the Open (of which Dasein’s understanding 
is only a moment) but also and especially establishes 
itself therein with the same gesture: “clearing of 
openness and establishment in the Open belong 
together” (1934-35/1964, p. 686). Of course, for the 
process of artistic creation this rift is expected to open 
in what is commonly called the materials of the 
artwork. But when Dasein experiences it within its 
very being – that is, as a cleavage within its existential 
structure whereby the categorial springs forth – the 
work accomplished becomes a self-sacrifice. It is this 
rift that separates, within Dasein’s embodied 
existence with others, those possibilities that are to 
remain open and continue making up a world from 
those that need to close for the sake of sheltering and 
sustaining the former.  
 
As this veridical rift, actual death breaks into and 
contaminates Dasein’s disclosed field of possibilities, 
thereby sealing some of them into a stiff, indubitable, 
compelling certainty that fixates and supports the 
remnant opening like a foundation. In the moment of 
vision, Dasein both “dies” through an actualization 
based on certainty and resumes its mode of Being its 
possibilities. This means that, in the proximity of 
actual death, its possibility always carries with it an 
urge to actualization that partly bereaves Dasein of its 
ontological status. Self-sacrifice is peculiar in that this 
urge protectively closes Dasein’s opening around its 
meaningful others, thus leaving them as its only 
moment of openness. 
 
The Heidegger of Being and Time reassures us that 
this disappropriation specific to anxiety remains only 
at the level of possibilities: “The closest closeness 
which one may have in Being towards death as a 
possibility, is as far as possible from anything actual” 
(1927/1962, pp. 306-307, original emphasis). This 
amounts to a restatement of the ontological difference 
between the full actuality of death and Dasein’s mode 
of Being its possibilities. It grants the possible not 
only ontological primacy over the actual, but, in 
principle, also the power to challenge the necessity of 
taking action anytime by questioning the grounds of 
this action. Anytime, except in the moment of vision. 
 
Heidegger would probably not deny that Dasein’s 
capacity to step back from its actual involvements in 
the world in order to question their grounds is 
circumstantially restrained, albeit in principle 
unlimited. But at this point his ontology seems to 
abandon a bit too soon the difficult problem of the 
actualization already at work in and through the 
moment of vision, as well as the discussion of the 
mysterious force that vision possesses to bereave 
possibilities of their light, free-floating character and 
turn one of them compellingly into a stiff, because 
irrevocable, event. No sooner does Being and Time 
concede to the resolute Dasein the actuality of taking 
action than it devolves the whole problematic onto 
philosophical anthropology (1927/1962, p. 348). The 
moment of vision not only discloses a new world of 
possibilities, but imperatively inscribes it within the 
fullest actuality of a resolution in view of making it 
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last, of turning it into a reliable foundation. 
 
This concern about the fixation [Feststellung] and 
preservation of the most insightful disclosure 
becomes a recurrent theme for Heidegger only later, 
as we will see shortly.4 An interruption of the endless 
procession of fleeting possibilities within Dasein’s 
opening is thus performed in and through the moment 
of vision itself, which amounts to a suspension of all 
questioning that would threaten to trivialize its 
instituting gesture. But one should not forget that, for 
Heidegger, the Augenblick has no connotation of 
objective brevity, since it eludes the time measured by 
instruments (1929-1930/1992b, §33); as foundational 
insight, it can last whole years. Within given 
circumstances, Dasein’s resolve to keep itself open 
through further inquiry may co-originally receive 
from Being itself an imperative to actualize a specific 
possibility first glimpsed at that very moment. 
 
Manifested as necessity for Dasein to act, this 
eruption of Being into the realm of mere possibilities 
is only insufficiently dealt with in Being and Time. At 
this relatively early stage in Heidegger’s thinking, the 
scrupulous precautions he takes confirm the tension 
between the actual pressure of necessity and Dasein’s 
being merely its possibilities. Although expressly 
granted to the resolute act, actuality is allowed to 
appear only in quotation marks and only in a context 
where the primacy of the possible is restated: 
“Resolution does not withdraw itself from ‘actuality’, 
but discovers first what is factically possible” (1927/ 
1962, p. 346). A couple of paragraphs further, 
Heidegger confesses his reluctance to speak of taking 
action, although through its resolve Dasein is said to 
be already taking action. 
 
Notwithstanding these tensions, one thing seems to be 
beyond doubt: namely, that resolve, certainty of 
oneself and an action other than thinking all erupt into 
the realm of mere possibilities in the moment of 
vision. Upon experiencing anxiety, a certainty is 
reached, a rock bottom, an independent and self-
contained “thingly moment” [Dingheit] impervious to 
any discursive opening. This interruption seizes upon 
a particular possibility and imperatively actualizes it 
into a foundation by burying the prudent questioning 
underneath, at least in the Augenblick. A genuine 
glimpse at the limit reverses, be it only for a moment, 
the primacy of the existential in favour of the 
categorial, in the mode of which Dasein reaches the 
(relative) certainty necessary for resolutely carrying 
out its action. 
 
4 For an examination of other problems that the Feststellung 
poses to Heidegger’s ontology, see Cristian, 1995. 
 
Founding Upon a Human Absence 
 
After Being and Time, the existentiell definiteness of 
Dasein’s resolution gets more boldly articulated and 
illustrated through examples. Without misreading into 
such examples types of authentic action uprooted 
from their ontological situation, their simple 
enumeration in the text disguises a problematic 
prioritizing among them. It is my contention that the 
tip of this hierarchical pyramid of practices may 
actually pierce through the limits of an ontology of 
finitude. If Heidegger’s political texts deserve serious 
philosophical reading, the claim that self-sacrifice is 
“the greatest thing of which a human being is 
capable” (Wolin, 1993, p. 40, original emphasis) 
threatens to compromise both the privilege of 
phronesis and the fundamental thesis of Dasein’s 
finitude. 
 
Heidegger’s later essay, “The Origin of the Work of 
Art”, lists some examples of founding acts presented 
as ways in which truth establishes itself in the entities 
opened up: the creation of the masterpiece, the 
establishment of the political state, the commerce 
with that unspecified entity characterized by fullest 
being, the thinker’s questioning and, not least, the 
essential sacrifice [wesentliche Opfer] (1934-35/1994, 
p. 49). Remarkably, now the last two items in the 
series appear distinct from one another, thus 
dispelling the conceivable objection that the term 
sacrificial offering [Opfer] as used by Heidegger 
refers strictly to Dasein’s thinking-as-action, not to a 
full-fledged action as such. 
 
All the instituting gestures enumerated above 
expressly instigate within their respective objects the 
struggle between closure and disclosure, between an 
access-giving and an access-denying moment. In each 
case, the newly disclosed horizon of possibilities not 
just opens up, but also needs to be entrusted to, the 
specific entity it arose from, in order to rest on and be 
fixated within it. Rooted in its receptivity to the voice 
of Being, Dasein’s creative genius is literally 
instrumental in bringing forth this new light and, 
simultaneously, in fixating it within the actuality that 
in each case hosted its advent – the artistic material of 
the masterpiece, the specific terms of the law, the 
ritual practices of a particular religion, the specifically 
articulated question, or Dasein’s own impossibility. It 
is only through this act of fixation that the truth of 
Being becomes in principle available to everyone. 
 
The argument advanced here relies upon the 
following analogy: the horizon of possibilities 
disclosed for others through Dasein’s self-sacrifice is, 
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with regard to the self-closing Dasein, what the world 
of the artwork [Welt] is with respect to the self-
secluding earth [Erde]. By world Heidegger 
designates “the ever-nonobjective to which we are 
subject as long as the paths of birth and death, 
blessing and curse keep us transported into Being” 
(1934-35/1994, pp. 30-31). Opposed to a world’s 
arising, and at the same time united with it in an 
original struggle, stands the self-secluding earth, a 
moment defined as “that whence the arising brings 
back and shelters everything that arises as such” 
(1934-35/1994, p. 28). Short of being fixated in a 
particular entity, the possibilities that make up a 
world would remain fleeting, indistinct, chaotic, 
incongruent with one another – in one word, 
ungraspable, and as such merely haunting 
transmission, not actually being its object. Alone their 
inscription within a “thingly element” can bring them 
under a law and thus allow them to be (only) what 
they are. 
 
Yet the “thingness” of one’s death does not go 
without saying. On the one hand, despite all attempts 
to bring it into light, death remains the most 
impenetrable mystery: the most irreversible, most 
inflexible, certain and, because of this, reliable event. 
Needless to mention how serviceable it turns out to be 
in stabilizing social unrest, establishing political 
domination, and even generating business. If the 
“thingly moment” constitutes the guarantor of 
lawfulness in the creation that it lodges, death can be 
credited with being the law par excellence. On the 
other hand, though, the insubstantiality of death 
makes us hesitate when designating it as a serviceable 
thing: it is, after all, nothing but absence, indeed, 
nothing through and through. What in its elusiveness 
resists being pinned down at the same time appears to 
be the condition of possibility of all fixity and rigor. 
Absence lets be what already is and does nothing but 
that; yet this letting be, by strictly preserving 
everything else, joins in the self-assertion of the very 
law governing entities – their Being. 
 
In the 1943 “Postscript to ‘What is Metaphysics?’”, 
Heidegger’s questioning into the foundational nothing 
[Nichts] equated with Being culminates in the 
particular response given to it by the profoundly 
daring Dasein: a serene commitment to sacrifice itself 
after abandoning the prudent, calculative and, because 
of this, indefinitely hesitant deliberation. When the 
self-sacrificial act, seen as “the departure of a being 
on a march for the preservation of Being’s favour” 
(1943/1996, p. 310), gets authentically recognized as 
the due human response to the Inevitable, its 
recognition is curiously claimed to be accompanied 
by a calm assurance [Gleichmut], not prudent 
suspicion. This commitment to redeem the dignity of 
Being has no specific end in view, as it allegedly 
stands in no need for results; hence, a prudent 
deliberation regarding it would simply not apply. 
Instead, the calm assurance of being in the right 
translates into insistence, intolerance toward 
calculations and, above all, courage for the “severing 
essence of every sacrifice” [abschiedliche Wesen 
jedes Opfer] (1943/1996, p. 311). This severing 
essence of sacrifice is another name for the rift that 
the artist was said to experience not directly in her 
own flesh but rather in the material of her work of art. 
 
At this stage, Heidegger would want self-sacrifice to 
tolerate no petty calculations in terms of gain or loss, 
although, with regard to its given situation among 
beings, a finite Dasein can only manage an 
improvement within certain limits, not a radical 
change. Now Dasein’s ultimate good boldly emerges 
from uncertainty and circumspection into a clarity 
ascribed beyond doubt to the silent voice of Being: to 
prove itself a match to Being in the task of rescuing 
the latter’s dignity (1943/1996, p. 311).5 As for the 
actual capacity to assume such a lofty and demanding 
task, Heidegger admits our poverty, but immediately 
invests it with the nobleness of concealing a treasure. 
It is with this treasure that Dasein’s debt to Being can 
be settled, in the sense of Levinas’s claim that “the 
human being buys back [rachète] the creation” (1971, 
p. 107). 
 
One notices that, in this discourse, it is no longer 
specific situations, practical issues that are negotiated, 
but rather status, dignity, favours, good will, 
nobleness, honour, gratitude – all symbolic values. To 
Being’s prodigal and obliging giving, the only 
suitable response is deemed to be Dasein’s equally 
prodigal expending of itself, untroubled by trivial 
concerns about more assessable goals. 
 
In the moment of vision that brings about Dasein’s 
resolution to depart from the world in a radical way, 
what gets sacrificed in the first place is Dasein’s 
tendency further to question into the grounds of this 
resolution. Notwithstanding that, as Heidegger often 
reminds us, essential thinking is intrinsically a way of 
acting, inauthentic flight from one’s own conscience 
remains also conceivable in the way of a questioning 
extended beyond the opportune time of action. No 
matter how vigorously philosophical interrogation 
 
5 This clarity of the voice of Being is due to the fact that it 
is not itself inscribed in any medium other than itself. It is 
mere presence of meaning in one’s consciousness or, as 
Derrida calls it, a “transcendental signifier”. For the 
problems it raises with regard to Heidegger’s ontology, see 
Derrida, 1967, pp. 33-39. 
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claims its belonging together with the enactment of 
self-sacrifice, their distinctness is always susceptible 
to confronting Dasein tragically, in the form of an 
uncompromising “either/or” choice. In other words, 
the veridical rift haunts thinking all along with its 
power to turn one specific possibility into effectively 
taken action and thus to set it apart from other, merely 
vacuous, possibilities.  
 
One notices here a peculiarity specific to the act of 
giving oneself away: although, as a good act, it 
remains its own end, at the same time it is intended to 
become someone else’s. Or, put differently, while 
being its own end it actually remains open-ended due 
to its essentially transmissible ownership. Being there 
means, from this latter perspective, not only 
solicitously disclosing the common good along with 
and for others, but also and inevitably being in the 
way of the others’ pursuit of it. The gift of Being is in 
principle subject to a multiple claim; it is essentially 
“up for grabs” insofar as it has not been explicitly 
assigned to anyone (from I am it does not necessarily 
follow that my claim to this entity designated by the 
pronoun I is privileged over and above others’ claims). 
Hence, the individual’s access to it gets both 
obstructed and opened by the other’s existence. To be 
among others means to be in an uncertain position 
vis-à-vis the common good:  the other’s presence can 
pave one’s way to it or stand in one’s way. 6  
Reciprocally, one’s own presence can open or close 
the others’ access to the common good. 
 
Preserving the Heroic 
 
If, within Dasein’s impossibility, a possibility for me 
is that its meaningful others can still be disclosed, it 
means that Dasein, apart from receiving its 
possibilities, also discovers itself capable of creating 
them out of and through its fully actualized 
annihilation. The important question in this regard is 
whether or not in this way it can be said to join in 
Being’s generous prodigality and higher dignity. 
 
Maurice Blanchot notes that the subject who gives 
itself death is not the same as the one who receives it 
(1955, p. 131). And yet, when this act is performed 
out of care for others, its addressees cannot be 
 
                                                
6  For this reason, Vogel’s claim that “my existence is 
rendered finite … also by the way my possibilities are 
conditioned by the presence of others over whom I have the 
power of life-or-death” fails to convince (1994, p. 92). The 
problem is precisely that there is not a single way in which 
one is conditioned by the presence of others, and this is due 
to the essential ambiguity of their presence for me: they can 
be not only an obstacle in my way but also the receivers of 
my gift of pure opening. 
considered alien either. In this form of transcendence, 
Dasein seems both to assume its finitude and to free 
itself from it. The certainty of itself that it reaches in 
the sacrificial resolution necessarily suspends the 
taking for granted of its own meaningful community. 
Or, what amounts to the same, Dasein gets certain of 
itself being always already claimed by a community 
whose very possibility of Being does not go without 
saying but may have to be won through and out of 
that Dasein’s very impossibility. 
 
The idea of Dasein’s being essentially a receiver, not 
a giver, of its own foundation is convincingly 
elaborated in §58 of Being and Time under the name 
of debt [Schuld]. For an ontology of finitude, 
Dasein’s debt cannot even in principle be paid back: 
“The Self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, 
can never get that basis into its power” (1927/1962, p. 
330). It is on this never emphasized by Heidegger that 
the finitude of Dasein is founded. However, 
notwithstanding that it cannot get this basis into its 
power, through self-sacrifice Dasein discovers at least 
the power to join in Being’s donation. If Dasein 
receives everything only in the name of others, if its 
very ownership of everything it owns becomes an 
issue, then giving “itself” the foundation by offering 
its meaningful others its very there seems to 
challenge the postulate of finitude.7 
 
The question that Dasein, if confined to its finitude, 
cannot raise is whether sacrificing its given possibility 
of questioning for the sake of offering it to its basis 
(its community) does not surpass in excellence the 
cultivation of prudence. Taking into account that, in 
the precariousness of social existence, the others 
remain eternally open – according to Levinas, all too 
open – to receive Dasein’s sacrifice, one has to decide 
first if this openness does not take precedence over a 
discursive one. The ultimate consecration of care 
might have to be entrusted to contingence, to a 
moment of carelessness that escapes the economy of 
prudence and elicits Dasein’s availability for the 
sacred in the form of a sacrifice [sacrum facere]. 
 
This facere, as the making of a categorial out of an 
existential structure, ultimately pertains to techne, not 
to phronesis. Prior to listening to the silent voice of 
Being and protecting the latter’s dignity through a 
grandiose yet somewhat vacuous commitment, it 
 
7 Derrida points out that there is “a structural disproportion 
or dissymmetry between the finite and responsible mortal 
on the one hand and the goodness of the infinite gift, on the 
other hand” (1992/1995, p. 51). Yet, when this finite mortal 
becomes itself the giver of the infinite gift, it is questionable 
whether its finitude remains, indeed, intact or gets affected 
by the ontological status of the gift. 




requires Dasein to regard itself more humbly, as just 
one removable element of the situation suspect of 
obstructing the meaningful others’ access to the 
common good. The idea that the others are, for 
Dasein, an innermost opening in need of preservation 
prior to any inquiry into its Being is not meant to 
dissolve the ontological into the ethical, but to point 
out that a commitment to finitude might in fact stand 
in the way of their equitable dialogue. 
The IPJP is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg in South Africa and Edith Cowan University’s Faculty 
of Regional Professional Studies in Australia. This document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any 
medium without the express permission of the publishers. 
 




The problem with relegating self-sacrifice to an 
ethical system is that it threatens to trivialize the 
terrifying splendour of its unique radiance into a 
horrific routine, for this practice remains, essentially, 
a techne. One is overwhelmed by the existential 
stature of a soldier who gave his life to save that of 
his comrades, or of an old professor who died 
shielding his young students from death. The blinding, 
abrasive light of the truth captured by these gestures 
and fixated atop the arch separating beings from 
nothingness keeps beaconing unobtrusively through 
our everyday confusion. It is simply there, far away 
and above us, lighthouse of an uncharted shore. But 
the mass-production of this luminous rift within the 
continuum of human life, the calculated ideological 
pressure put on individuals to rip themselves open in 
search of courage’s “raw Being” horrifies. The unique 
greatness of the heroic self-sacrifice is dwarfed 
precisely to the extent to which a community’s need 
for its repetition is vehemently voiced. 
 
Ultimately, does self-sacrifice come closer to a piece 
of ordinary, ideologically devised equipment for 
symbolizing, or to a sublime work of art? Heidegger 
reminds us that, when completed, equipment 
completely disappears in its use: the perfect tool is the 
one that never draws the user’s attention toward it but 
stays all the more serviceable the more neglected it 
gets. In the mode of Being of equipment, the material 
is used up insofar as it sinks without remainder into 
inconspicuousness. Not so for the work of art, in 
which, through the creative process, the earth first 
gets moved into the opening of the world and kept 
conspicuously there. In a masterpiece, “the earth is 
not simply the Closed but rather that which rises up as 
self-closing” (1934-35/1994, p. 42). This idea of 
rising up as self-closing acquires a particular weight 
when the material in case is a human being’s absence. 
For how can an absence be said to rise up and stand 
out as such? 
 
In his essay “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction,” Walter Benjamin brings 
into question the quality of a presence and signals the 
degradation to which the quality of artworks is 
subject through their being reproduced (1936/1968, p. 
221). By analogy, one can perhaps think here of the 
quality of that absence left behind through self-
sacrifice and of its degradation through massive 
reproduction. This suggests that the loftiest in human 
existence can neither be taught, nor learned through 
imitation, and that the surest way to compromise its 
value is to found a school thereof. Conversely, letting 
an incommensurably great act be what it is without 
degrading it through massive and compulsive 
reproduction constitutes in fact its discrete 
preservation, not neglect. For Heidegger, even when 
separated by the veil of the present, creators and 
preservers remain most intimately bound together in 
the work: “Just as a work cannot be without being 
created but is essentially in need of creators, so what 
is created cannot itself come into being without those 
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